use core::cell::Cell; use core::sync::atomic::{compiler_fence, AtomicU32, AtomicU8, Ordering}; use core::{mem, ptr}; use critical_section::CriticalSection; use embassy_sync::blocking_mutex::raw::CriticalSectionRawMutex; use embassy_sync::blocking_mutex::CriticalSectionMutex as Mutex; use embassy_time::driver::{AlarmHandle, Driver}; use crate::interrupt::InterruptExt; use crate::{interrupt, pac}; fn rtc() -> &'static pac::rtc0::RegisterBlock { unsafe { &*pac::RTC1::ptr() } } /// Calculate the timestamp from the period count and the tick count. /// /// The RTC counter is 24 bit. Ticking at 32768hz, it overflows every ~8 minutes. This is /// too short. We must make it "never" overflow. /// /// The obvious way would be to count overflow periods. Every time the counter overflows, /// increase a `periods` variable. `now()` simply does `periods << 24 + counter`. So, the logic /// around an overflow would look like this: /// /// ```not_rust /// periods = 1, counter = 0xFF_FFFE --> now = 0x1FF_FFFE /// periods = 1, counter = 0xFF_FFFF --> now = 0x1FF_FFFF /// **OVERFLOW** /// periods = 2, counter = 0x00_0000 --> now = 0x200_0000 /// periods = 2, counter = 0x00_0001 --> now = 0x200_0001 /// ``` /// /// The problem is this is vulnerable to race conditions if `now()` runs at the exact time an /// overflow happens. /// /// If `now()` reads `periods` first and `counter` later, and overflow happens between the reads, /// it would return a wrong value: /// /// ```not_rust /// periods = 1 (OLD), counter = 0x00_0000 (NEW) --> now = 0x100_0000 -> WRONG /// ``` /// /// It fails similarly if it reads `counter` first and `periods` second. /// /// To fix this, we define a "period" to be 2^23 ticks (instead of 2^24). One "overflow cycle" is 2 periods. /// /// - `period` is incremented on overflow (at counter value 0) /// - `period` is incremented "midway" between overflows (at counter value 0x80_0000) /// /// Therefore, when `period` is even, counter is in 0..0x7f_ffff. When odd, counter is in 0x80_0000..0xFF_FFFF /// This allows for now() to return the correct value even if it races an overflow. /// /// To get `now()`, `period` is read first, then `counter` is read. If the counter value matches /// the expected range for the `period` parity, we're done. If it doesn't, this means that /// a new period start has raced us between reading `period` and `counter`, so we assume the `counter` value /// corresponds to the next period. /// /// `period` is a 32bit integer, so It overflows on 2^32 * 2^23 / 32768 seconds of uptime, which is 34865 /// years. For comparison, flash memory like the one containing your firmware is usually rated to retain /// data for only 10-20 years. 34865 years is long enough! fn calc_now(period: u32, counter: u32) -> u64 { ((period as u64) << 23) + ((counter ^ ((period & 1) << 23)) as u64) } fn compare_n(n: usize) -> u32 { 1 << (n + 16) } #[cfg(test)] mod test { use super::*; #[test] fn test_calc_now() { assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x000000), 0x0_000000); assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x000001), 0x0_000001); assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x7FFFFF), 0x0_7FFFFF); assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x7FFFFF), 0x1_7FFFFF); assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x800000), 0x0_800000); assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x800000), 0x0_800000); assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x800001), 0x0_800001); assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0xFFFFFF), 0x0_FFFFFF); assert_eq!(calc_now(2, 0xFFFFFF), 0x1_FFFFFF); assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x000000), 0x1_000000); assert_eq!(calc_now(2, 0x000000), 0x1_000000); } } struct AlarmState { timestamp: Cell, // This is really a Option<(fn(*mut ()), *mut ())> // but fn pointers aren't allowed in const yet callback: Cell<*const ()>, ctx: Cell<*mut ()>, } unsafe impl Send for AlarmState {} impl AlarmState { const fn new() -> Self { Self { timestamp: Cell::new(u64::MAX), callback: Cell::new(ptr::null()), ctx: Cell::new(ptr::null_mut()), } } } const ALARM_COUNT: usize = 3; struct RtcDriver { /// Number of 2^23 periods elapsed since boot. period: AtomicU32, alarm_count: AtomicU8, /// Timestamp at which to fire alarm. u64::MAX if no alarm is scheduled. alarms: Mutex<[AlarmState; ALARM_COUNT]>, } const ALARM_STATE_NEW: AlarmState = AlarmState::new(); embassy_time::time_driver_impl!(static DRIVER: RtcDriver = RtcDriver { period: AtomicU32::new(0), alarm_count: AtomicU8::new(0), alarms: Mutex::const_new(CriticalSectionRawMutex::new(), [ALARM_STATE_NEW; ALARM_COUNT]), }); impl RtcDriver { fn init(&'static self, irq_prio: crate::interrupt::Priority) { let r = rtc(); r.cc[3].write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(0x800000) }); r.intenset.write(|w| { let w = w.ovrflw().set(); let w = w.compare3().set(); w }); r.tasks_clear.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(1) }); r.tasks_start.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(1) }); // Wait for clear while r.counter.read().bits() != 0 {} interrupt::RTC1.set_priority(irq_prio); unsafe { interrupt::RTC1.enable() }; } fn on_interrupt(&self) { let r = rtc(); if r.events_ovrflw.read().bits() == 1 { r.events_ovrflw.write(|w| w); self.next_period(); } if r.events_compare[3].read().bits() == 1 { r.events_compare[3].write(|w| w); self.next_period(); } for n in 0..ALARM_COUNT { if r.events_compare[n].read().bits() == 1 { r.events_compare[n].write(|w| w); critical_section::with(|cs| { self.trigger_alarm(n, cs); }) } } } fn next_period(&self) { critical_section::with(|cs| { let r = rtc(); let period = self.period.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) + 1; let t = (period as u64) << 23; for n in 0..ALARM_COUNT { let alarm = &self.alarms.borrow(cs)[n]; let at = alarm.timestamp.get(); if at < t + 0xc00000 { // just enable it. `set_alarm` has already set the correct CC val. r.intenset.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) }); } } }) } fn get_alarm<'a>(&'a self, cs: CriticalSection<'a>, alarm: AlarmHandle) -> &'a AlarmState { // safety: we're allowed to assume the AlarmState is created by us, and // we never create one that's out of bounds. unsafe { self.alarms.borrow(cs).get_unchecked(alarm.id() as usize) } } fn trigger_alarm(&self, n: usize, cs: CriticalSection) { let r = rtc(); r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) }); let alarm = &self.alarms.borrow(cs)[n]; alarm.timestamp.set(u64::MAX); // Call after clearing alarm, so the callback can set another alarm. // safety: // - we can ignore the possiblity of `f` being unset (null) because of the safety contract of `allocate_alarm`. // - other than that we only store valid function pointers into alarm.callback let f: fn(*mut ()) = unsafe { mem::transmute(alarm.callback.get()) }; f(alarm.ctx.get()); } } impl Driver for RtcDriver { fn now(&self) -> u64 { // `period` MUST be read before `counter`, see comment at the top for details. let period = self.period.load(Ordering::Relaxed); compiler_fence(Ordering::Acquire); let counter = rtc().counter.read().bits(); calc_now(period, counter) } unsafe fn allocate_alarm(&self) -> Option { let id = self.alarm_count.fetch_update(Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire, |x| { if x < ALARM_COUNT as u8 { Some(x + 1) } else { None } }); match id { Ok(id) => Some(AlarmHandle::new(id)), Err(_) => None, } } fn set_alarm_callback(&self, alarm: AlarmHandle, callback: fn(*mut ()), ctx: *mut ()) { critical_section::with(|cs| { let alarm = self.get_alarm(cs, alarm); alarm.callback.set(callback as *const ()); alarm.ctx.set(ctx); }) } fn set_alarm(&self, alarm: AlarmHandle, timestamp: u64) -> bool { critical_section::with(|cs| { let n = alarm.id() as _; let alarm = self.get_alarm(cs, alarm); alarm.timestamp.set(timestamp); let r = rtc(); let t = self.now(); if timestamp <= t { // If alarm timestamp has passed the alarm will not fire. // Disarm the alarm and return `false` to indicate that. r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) }); alarm.timestamp.set(u64::MAX); return false; } // If it hasn't triggered yet, setup it in the compare channel. // Write the CC value regardless of whether we're going to enable it now or not. // This way, when we enable it later, the right value is already set. // nrf52 docs say: // If the COUNTER is N, writing N or N+1 to a CC register may not trigger a COMPARE event. // To workaround this, we never write a timestamp smaller than N+3. // N+2 is not safe because rtc can tick from N to N+1 between calling now() and writing cc. // // It is impossible for rtc to tick more than once because // - this code takes less time than 1 tick // - it runs with interrupts disabled so nothing else can preempt it. // // This means that an alarm can be delayed for up to 2 ticks (from t+1 to t+3), but this is allowed // by the Alarm trait contract. What's not allowed is triggering alarms *before* their scheduled time, // and we don't do that here. let safe_timestamp = timestamp.max(t + 3); r.cc[n].write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(safe_timestamp as u32 & 0xFFFFFF) }); let diff = timestamp - t; if diff < 0xc00000 { r.intenset.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) }); } else { // If it's too far in the future, don't setup the compare channel yet. // It will be setup later by `next_period`. r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) }); } true }) } } #[cfg(feature = "rt")] #[interrupt] fn RTC1() { DRIVER.on_interrupt() } pub(crate) fn init(irq_prio: crate::interrupt::Priority) { DRIVER.init(irq_prio) }