embassy/embassy-nrf/src/time_driver.rs

307 lines
11 KiB
Rust

use core::cell::Cell;
use core::sync::atomic::{compiler_fence, AtomicU32, AtomicU8, Ordering};
use core::{mem, ptr};
use critical_section::CriticalSection;
use embassy_sync::blocking_mutex::raw::CriticalSectionRawMutex;
use embassy_sync::blocking_mutex::CriticalSectionMutex as Mutex;
use embassy_time::driver::{AlarmHandle, Driver};
use crate::interrupt::InterruptExt;
use crate::{interrupt, pac};
fn rtc() -> &'static pac::rtc0::RegisterBlock {
unsafe { &*pac::RTC1::ptr() }
}
/// Calculate the timestamp from the period count and the tick count.
///
/// The RTC counter is 24 bit. Ticking at 32768hz, it overflows every ~8 minutes. This is
/// too short. We must make it "never" overflow.
///
/// The obvious way would be to count overflow periods. Every time the counter overflows,
/// increase a `periods` variable. `now()` simply does `periods << 24 + counter`. So, the logic
/// around an overflow would look like this:
///
/// ```not_rust
/// periods = 1, counter = 0xFF_FFFE --> now = 0x1FF_FFFE
/// periods = 1, counter = 0xFF_FFFF --> now = 0x1FF_FFFF
/// **OVERFLOW**
/// periods = 2, counter = 0x00_0000 --> now = 0x200_0000
/// periods = 2, counter = 0x00_0001 --> now = 0x200_0001
/// ```
///
/// The problem is this is vulnerable to race conditions if `now()` runs at the exact time an
/// overflow happens.
///
/// If `now()` reads `periods` first and `counter` later, and overflow happens between the reads,
/// it would return a wrong value:
///
/// ```not_rust
/// periods = 1 (OLD), counter = 0x00_0000 (NEW) --> now = 0x100_0000 -> WRONG
/// ```
///
/// It fails similarly if it reads `counter` first and `periods` second.
///
/// To fix this, we define a "period" to be 2^23 ticks (instead of 2^24). One "overflow cycle" is 2 periods.
///
/// - `period` is incremented on overflow (at counter value 0)
/// - `period` is incremented "midway" between overflows (at counter value 0x80_0000)
///
/// Therefore, when `period` is even, counter is in 0..0x7f_ffff. When odd, counter is in 0x80_0000..0xFF_FFFF
/// This allows for now() to return the correct value even if it races an overflow.
///
/// To get `now()`, `period` is read first, then `counter` is read. If the counter value matches
/// the expected range for the `period` parity, we're done. If it doesn't, this means that
/// a new period start has raced us between reading `period` and `counter`, so we assume the `counter` value
/// corresponds to the next period.
///
/// `period` is a 32bit integer, so It overflows on 2^32 * 2^23 / 32768 seconds of uptime, which is 34865
/// years. For comparison, flash memory like the one containing your firmware is usually rated to retain
/// data for only 10-20 years. 34865 years is long enough!
fn calc_now(period: u32, counter: u32) -> u64 {
((period as u64) << 23) + ((counter ^ ((period & 1) << 23)) as u64)
}
fn compare_n(n: usize) -> u32 {
1 << (n + 16)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_calc_now() {
assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x000000), 0x0_000000);
assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x000001), 0x0_000001);
assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x7FFFFF), 0x0_7FFFFF);
assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x7FFFFF), 0x1_7FFFFF);
assert_eq!(calc_now(0, 0x800000), 0x0_800000);
assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x800000), 0x0_800000);
assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x800001), 0x0_800001);
assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0xFFFFFF), 0x0_FFFFFF);
assert_eq!(calc_now(2, 0xFFFFFF), 0x1_FFFFFF);
assert_eq!(calc_now(1, 0x000000), 0x1_000000);
assert_eq!(calc_now(2, 0x000000), 0x1_000000);
}
}
struct AlarmState {
timestamp: Cell<u64>,
// This is really a Option<(fn(*mut ()), *mut ())>
// but fn pointers aren't allowed in const yet
callback: Cell<*const ()>,
ctx: Cell<*mut ()>,
}
unsafe impl Send for AlarmState {}
impl AlarmState {
const fn new() -> Self {
Self {
timestamp: Cell::new(u64::MAX),
callback: Cell::new(ptr::null()),
ctx: Cell::new(ptr::null_mut()),
}
}
}
const ALARM_COUNT: usize = 3;
struct RtcDriver {
/// Number of 2^23 periods elapsed since boot.
period: AtomicU32,
alarm_count: AtomicU8,
/// Timestamp at which to fire alarm. u64::MAX if no alarm is scheduled.
alarms: Mutex<[AlarmState; ALARM_COUNT]>,
}
const ALARM_STATE_NEW: AlarmState = AlarmState::new();
embassy_time::time_driver_impl!(static DRIVER: RtcDriver = RtcDriver {
period: AtomicU32::new(0),
alarm_count: AtomicU8::new(0),
alarms: Mutex::const_new(CriticalSectionRawMutex::new(), [ALARM_STATE_NEW; ALARM_COUNT]),
});
impl RtcDriver {
fn init(&'static self, irq_prio: crate::interrupt::Priority) {
let r = rtc();
r.cc[3].write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(0x800000) });
r.intenset.write(|w| {
let w = w.ovrflw().set();
let w = w.compare3().set();
w
});
r.tasks_clear.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(1) });
r.tasks_start.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(1) });
// Wait for clear
while r.counter.read().bits() != 0 {}
interrupt::RTC1.set_priority(irq_prio);
unsafe { interrupt::RTC1.enable() };
}
fn on_interrupt(&self) {
let r = rtc();
if r.events_ovrflw.read().bits() == 1 {
r.events_ovrflw.write(|w| w);
self.next_period();
}
if r.events_compare[3].read().bits() == 1 {
r.events_compare[3].write(|w| w);
self.next_period();
}
for n in 0..ALARM_COUNT {
if r.events_compare[n].read().bits() == 1 {
r.events_compare[n].write(|w| w);
critical_section::with(|cs| {
self.trigger_alarm(n, cs);
})
}
}
}
fn next_period(&self) {
critical_section::with(|cs| {
let r = rtc();
let period = self.period.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) + 1;
let t = (period as u64) << 23;
for n in 0..ALARM_COUNT {
let alarm = &self.alarms.borrow(cs)[n];
let at = alarm.timestamp.get();
if at < t + 0xc00000 {
// just enable it. `set_alarm` has already set the correct CC val.
r.intenset.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) });
}
}
})
}
fn get_alarm<'a>(&'a self, cs: CriticalSection<'a>, alarm: AlarmHandle) -> &'a AlarmState {
// safety: we're allowed to assume the AlarmState is created by us, and
// we never create one that's out of bounds.
unsafe { self.alarms.borrow(cs).get_unchecked(alarm.id() as usize) }
}
fn trigger_alarm(&self, n: usize, cs: CriticalSection) {
let r = rtc();
r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) });
let alarm = &self.alarms.borrow(cs)[n];
alarm.timestamp.set(u64::MAX);
// Call after clearing alarm, so the callback can set another alarm.
// safety:
// - we can ignore the possiblity of `f` being unset (null) because of the safety contract of `allocate_alarm`.
// - other than that we only store valid function pointers into alarm.callback
let f: fn(*mut ()) = unsafe { mem::transmute(alarm.callback.get()) };
f(alarm.ctx.get());
}
}
impl Driver for RtcDriver {
fn now(&self) -> u64 {
// `period` MUST be read before `counter`, see comment at the top for details.
let period = self.period.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
compiler_fence(Ordering::Acquire);
let counter = rtc().counter.read().bits();
calc_now(period, counter)
}
unsafe fn allocate_alarm(&self) -> Option<AlarmHandle> {
let id = self.alarm_count.fetch_update(Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire, |x| {
if x < ALARM_COUNT as u8 {
Some(x + 1)
} else {
None
}
});
match id {
Ok(id) => Some(AlarmHandle::new(id)),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
fn set_alarm_callback(&self, alarm: AlarmHandle, callback: fn(*mut ()), ctx: *mut ()) {
critical_section::with(|cs| {
let alarm = self.get_alarm(cs, alarm);
alarm.callback.set(callback as *const ());
alarm.ctx.set(ctx);
})
}
fn set_alarm(&self, alarm: AlarmHandle, timestamp: u64) -> bool {
critical_section::with(|cs| {
let n = alarm.id() as _;
let alarm = self.get_alarm(cs, alarm);
alarm.timestamp.set(timestamp);
let r = rtc();
let t = self.now();
if timestamp <= t {
// If alarm timestamp has passed the alarm will not fire.
// Disarm the alarm and return `false` to indicate that.
r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) });
alarm.timestamp.set(u64::MAX);
return false;
}
// If it hasn't triggered yet, setup it in the compare channel.
// Write the CC value regardless of whether we're going to enable it now or not.
// This way, when we enable it later, the right value is already set.
// nrf52 docs say:
// If the COUNTER is N, writing N or N+1 to a CC register may not trigger a COMPARE event.
// To workaround this, we never write a timestamp smaller than N+3.
// N+2 is not safe because rtc can tick from N to N+1 between calling now() and writing cc.
//
// It is impossible for rtc to tick more than once because
// - this code takes less time than 1 tick
// - it runs with interrupts disabled so nothing else can preempt it.
//
// This means that an alarm can be delayed for up to 2 ticks (from t+1 to t+3), but this is allowed
// by the Alarm trait contract. What's not allowed is triggering alarms *before* their scheduled time,
// and we don't do that here.
let safe_timestamp = timestamp.max(t + 3);
r.cc[n].write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(safe_timestamp as u32 & 0xFFFFFF) });
let diff = timestamp - t;
if diff < 0xc00000 {
r.intenset.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) });
} else {
// If it's too far in the future, don't setup the compare channel yet.
// It will be setup later by `next_period`.
r.intenclr.write(|w| unsafe { w.bits(compare_n(n)) });
}
true
})
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "rt")]
#[interrupt]
fn RTC1() {
DRIVER.on_interrupt()
}
pub(crate) fn init(irq_prio: crate::interrupt::Priority) {
DRIVER.init(irq_prio)
}