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Merge #1153

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1153: Documentation on verifying firmware r=lulf a=huntc

The documentation has been enhanced to describe the verification of firmware with the firmware updater. Examples have also been provided that describe how keys can be generated and how firmware can be signed.

Co-authored-by: huntc <huntchr@gmail.com>
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bors[bot] 2023-01-14 08:26:30 +00:00 committed by GitHub
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docs/modules/ROOT/pages/bootloader.adoc
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ The bootloader can be used either as a library or be flashed directly if you are
By design, the bootloader does not provide any network capabilities. Networking capabilities for fetching new firmware can be provided by the user application, using the bootloader as a library for updating the firmware, or by using the bootloader as a library and adding this capability yourself.
The bootloader supports both internal and external flash by relying on the `embedded-storage` traits.
The bootloader supports both internal and external flash by relying on the `embedded-storage` traits. The bootloader optionally supports the verification of firmware that has been digitally signed (recommended).
== Hardware support
@ -44,3 +44,51 @@ The partitions for ACTIVE (+BOOTLOADER), DFU and BOOTLOADER_STATE may be placed
The BOOTLOADER_STATE partition must be big enough to store one word per page in the ACTIVE and DFU partitions combined.
The bootloader has a platform-agnostic part, which implements the power fail safe swapping algorithm given the boundaries set by the partitions. The platform-specific part is a minimal shim that provides additional functionality such as watchdogs or supporting the nRF52 softdevice.
=== FirmwareUpdater
The `FirmwareUpdater` is an object for conveniently flashing firmware to the DFU partition and subsequently marking it as being ready for swapping with the active partition on the next reset. Its principle methods are `write_firmware`, which is called once per the size of the flash "write block" (typically 4KiB), and `mark_updated`, which is the final call.
=== Verification
The bootloader supports the verification of firmware that has been flashed to the DFU partition. Verification requires that firmware has been signed digitally using link:https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/[`ed25519`] signatures. With verification enabled, the `FirmwareUpdater::verify_and_mark_updated` method is called in place of `mark_updated`. A public key and signature are required, along with the actual length of the firmware that has been flashed. If verification fails then the firmware will not be marked as updated and therefore be rejected.
Signatures are normally conveyed with the firmware to be updated and not written to flash. How signatures are provided is a firmware responsibility.
To enable verification use either the `ed25519-dalek` or `ed25519-salty` features when depending on the `embassy-boot` crate. We recommend `ed25519-salty` at this time due to its small size.
==== Tips on keys and signing with ed25519
Ed25519 is a public key signature system where you are responsible for keeping the private key secure. We recommend embedding the *public* key in your program so that it can be easily passed to `verify_and_mark_updated`. An example declaration of the public key in your firmware:
[source, rust]
----
static PUBLIC_SIGNING_KEY: &[u8] = include_bytes!("key.pub");
----
Signatures are often conveyed along with firmware by appending them.
Ed25519 keys can be generated by a variety of tools. We recommend link:https://man.openbsd.org/signify[`signify`] as it is in wide use to sign and verify OpenBSD distributions, and is straightforward to use.
The following set of Bash commands can be used to generate public and private keys on Unix platforms, and also generate a local `key.pub` file with the `signify` file headers removed. Declare a `SECRETS_DIR` environment variable in a secure location.
[source, bash]
----
signify -G -n -p $SECRETS_DIR/key.pub -s $SECRETS_DIR/key.sec
tail -n1 $SECRETS_DIR/key.pub | base64 -d -i - | dd ibs=10 skip=1 > key.pub
chmod 700 $SECRETS_DIR/key.sec
export SECRET_SIGNING_KEY=$(tail -n1 $SECRETS_DIR/key.sec)
----
Then, to sign your firmware given a declaration of `FIRMWARE_DIR` and a firmware filename of `myfirmware`:
[source, bash]
----
shasum -a 512 -b $FIRMWARE_DIR/myfirmware > $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt
cat $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt | dd ibs=128 count=1 | xxd -p -r > $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt
signify -S -s $SECRETS_DIR/key.sec -m $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt -x $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt.sig
cp $FIRMWARE_DIR/myfirmware $FIRMWARE_DIR/myfirmware+signed
tail -n1 $SECRETS_DIR/message.txt.sig | base64 -d -i - | dd ibs=10 skip=1 >> $FIRMWARE_DIR/myfirmware+signed
----
Remember, guard the `$SECRETS_DIR/key.sec` key as compromising it means that another party can sign your firmware.